Global Internet Web Filtering – Political

Où en est-on dans ce domaine ?
Quelle liberté sur internet et quels sont les pays dont le filtrage est fort ?
Selon Open Net Initiative, voici les plus mauvais élèves :

A noter qu’aucune évidence de filtrage ne signifie pas son absence…

Filtrage au niveau politique :

Omniprésent pour la Chine – Iran – Tunisie – Vietnam – Myanmar – Syrie viennent ensuite avec des restrictions substantielles Ouzbékistan – Ethiopie – Libye – Arabie Saoudite – Pakistan

Intéressant le rapport dissèque la Russie, de manière générale la Fédération de Russie ne ferait pas de filtrage technique -quoique les tests n’ont pas pu être réalisés de manière optimale, mais on ne connait pas la raison de cette impossibilité- mais une forte surveillance du net est présente. Voir ce billet sur SORM. Une sorte de filtrage du type : “vous savez que nous savons ou pouvons savoir… si nous voulons”, message subversif et clair.

  • […] Tests were made in the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, although in these two cases limitations on the testing methodology do not allow us to claim comprehensive results.
  • […] Overall, Internet penetration in Russia lags behind that of other industrialized nations (15 percent as of 2005),4 and is relatively high only in large cities (particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg). Voir billets au sujet de l’audience internet en Russie ici et ici.
  • […] Russia’s legal approach to Internet surveillance for law enforcement (that is, the System for Operational-Investigative Activities or SORM-II, which allows security services unfettered physical access to ISP networks)
  • […] At the regulatory and technical level, SORM-II requires ISPs to provide the Federal Security Service (FSB) with statistics about all Internet traffic that goes through the ISP servers (including the time of an online session, the IP address of the user, and the data that were transmitted). ISPs themselves are responsible for the cost and maintenance of the hardware and connections. ISP objections to SORM-II, which raised concerns about individual privacy, resulted in the providers being stripped of their licenses.
  • As a consequence, SORM requires government personnel to obtain a court order to intercept telephone conversations, electronic communications, or postal correspondence. In reality, however, the FSB will not bother to seek a warrant. Recently a senior FSB official sought to apply similar registration requirements for all mobile phones with Internet capabilities. However, despite this formidable surveillance potential, there is doubt about the actual capacity of the FSB to analyze the data collected.

Pour être fairplay, il faut aussi ajouter que finalement “In many respects, SORM is not unlike a combination of the Unites States’ Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)12 and the recent “warrantless” provisions for wiretapping, including the PATRIOT Act13 passed after the attacks of 9/11.” … (sic !)

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